In der Rechtssache LaChance v. Rigoli, 325 Mass. 425, 427 (1950), where the applicant, a builder, expected to be paid by the tenants of the land but not by the owner of the land, we noted that the landowner was not responsible. As we found in Glovsky v. Holly Point Estates, Inc., loc. cit., 98, where a builder, with the permission of a seller, constructs a home in order to promote his own objectives (payment of lots from the proceeds of sale) and at his own risk, he cannot recover his disbursements. [Note 2] Where the services are provided by one party and voluntarily accepted by another party, the presumption that payment is expected for that party, as well as an implied promise of payment for the reasonable value of those services, may be rebutted by a strong personal interest of the party providing those services. Compensation according to a quasi-contractual theory is not time-barred if the services were provided solely for the purpose of attracting a company Each of these examples embodies a quasi-contractual claim. An official offer and acceptance may be lacking, but this should not prevent either party from admitting the essence of a contractual relationship.
Ultimately, fairness may prevent either party from denying the existence of a contract-like existence. Quasi-contracts are legally required agreements that define a party`s obligation to another party if the former owns the assets of the second party, that is, something is acquired by one party at the expense of another party. The court creates them in order to avoid the unjustified enrichment of a party who pays in exchange for goods or services. Since the court prepares them, neither party can oppose them and they are obliged to comply with them. Part of the difficulty of a precise line-based analytical plot in this area is reflected in Langdell`s following remarks: «Strictly speaking, any obligation is created by law. When we say that a contract creates an obligation, it only means that the law attaches an obligation to each contract. A contract can be defined quite well as an agreement to which the law attaches an obligation. Strictly speaking, an offence also creates an obligation in the same way as a contract, namely the obligation to make reparation for the offence or to satisfy it in full; however, it is an obligation imposed by law on a criminal offence only by remedying the offence. Similarly, failure to do so creates a new obligation to remedy or comply with the infringement. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction, 1 Harv.Law Rev. (1887) 55, 56, note. Reflecting on such considerations probably led to Holmes` famous remark: «If you commit a crime, you are obliged to pay a compensatory sum. When you enter into a contract, you are obligated [under customary law as opposed to equity] to pay a compensatory amount unless the promised event occurs, and that`s the difference.
«Holmes, The Way of the Law, 10 Harv.L.Rev. (1897) 457, 462. Collected Legal Papers (1920) 167, 175. In The Common Law (1881) 301, he had said: «The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is that the law requires the donor to pay damages if the promised event does not occur»; cf. his opinion in Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 1930, 190 U.S. 540, 543, 23 pp. Ct. 754, 47 L.
Ed. 1171. In 1883, he said in a letter in which he explained his thesis: «* * * * I am less and less inclined to make much use of the old distinction between primary rights, duties and consequences or the rights of punishment or whatever you want to call them. The main task is little more than a practical clue or a means of predicting the occurrence of public authority. In 1928, he said he did not mean «that a man promises X or pays damages. I don`t think a man promises to pay more damages in the contract than in tort. He commits an act that makes him responsible if a certain event does not occur, just as his criminal act makes it simpler. Holmes-Pollock Letters (1941) I, 20-21; II, 233; see also I, 79-80, 119, 177; II, 55, 200. For a troubled reaction to Holmes` use of Occam`s razor, see Buckland, Some Reflections on Jurisprudence (1945) 96-107. The plaintiff, a contractor, brought an action in a district court to recover the quasi-contract of two partially completed houses he had built on two parcels of land owned by the defendant. The judge found that the defendant had been unfairly enriched and ruled that a legally implied contract allowed the plaintiff to claim damages in the amount of $15,000, the value of the benefits granted to the defendant`s property. The defendant appealed and the Appeal Division set aside the judgment and ordered the defendant to register the judgment.
The plaintiff is now appealing to this tribunal. On appeal, the applicant argues that the Appeal Division`s order should be set aside because the evidence supports the judge`s finding of a legally implied contract that requires the defendant to pay the value of the partially completed houses on his property. He argues that the law allows him to recover on the basis of a quasi-contractual theory even if there is an express agreement between the parties on the sale and purchase of the lots and if the party claiming damages has breached the agreement. He further submits that the evidence also supports the judge`s conclusion that the plaintiff was not responsible for the breach of contract and that the defendant was aware of the improvement of the property, accepted it and was involved in an enterprise of common interest to both parties and should therefore reasonably have expected to pay for it. There are situations where there is no contract between the parties. But even then, some social relationships create specific obligations that some parties must fulfill upon court order. These obligations are called quasi-contracts because they create the same obligations that they would have arisen in the case of the regular contract. These quasi-treaties are drawn up on the basis of the principles of justice, equality and good conscience. .